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Abstract 
In this comment, the author reflects on surveillance from a critical theory approach, his involvement in surveillance 
research and projects, and the status of the study of surveillance. The comment ascertains a lack of critical thinking 
about surveillance, questions the existence of something called “surveillance studies” as opposed to a critical theory of 
society, and reflects on issues such as Edward Snowden’s revelations, and Foucault and Marx in the context of 
surveillance. 
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I have since 2008 been active in research networks and 
involved in one nationally funded and two EU-funded 
research projects on surveillance. I have worked with 
PhD students and postdocs on the topic of surveillance, 
have written multiple articles and chapters, and have 
edited books on surveillance in general as well as digi-
tal surveillance in particular. In this comment, I reflect 
on the relationship of surveillance and critical theory 
and my experiences in studying surveillance. 
There has been surprisingly little use of Karl Marx 
and the Frankfurt School’s works for studying surveil-
lance and privacy. There have been some exceptions, 
such as the works by Oscar Gandy, Thomas Mathiesen, 
and studies inspired by Harry Braverman’s labour pro-
cess theory. Studies of surveillance tend to see Marx 
only as relevant for understanding the surveillance of 
workers or neglect Marx and Marxist theory altogether 
with the well-known (and false) argument that his 
works are outdated (see: Fuchs & Mosco, 2012; Fuchs, 
2014a). When I started research on surveillance, I set 
myself as one of the tasks to conduct studies that ex-
plore the relationship of capitalist society and surveil-
lance. It is important to see that Marx and Marxism 
matter in this respect not just for understanding eco-
nomic surveillance, but also for explaining the connec-
tion of surveillance with the modern state, media and 
technology, ideologies, hegemony, class struggles, and 
alternatives to surveillance society (see for example: 
Allmer, Fuchs, Kreilinger, & Sevignani, 2014; Fuchs, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012c, 2012d, 2013a; 
Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, & Sandoval, 2012; 
Fuchs & Mosco, 2012; Fuchs & Trottier, 2013, forth-
coming a, Trottier & Fuchs, 2015). The modern econo-
my and the modern state depend on the control of 
workers, consumers, prosumers, and citizens. Surveil-
lance is a form of domination that is an inherent fea-
ture of capitalism.  
For grounding a critical theory of privacy and sur-
veillance, I have found it interesting to explore the rela-
tionship of Marx and Foucault (see for example: Fuchs, 
2013a; Fuchs, 2011a). The notions of control, power, 
and surveillance are an obvious point of departure. It 
should also be seen that Foucault (2008) introduced his 
notion of governmentality in a profound study of the 
20th century’s political economic theory and the rise of 
neo-liberalism. In contemporary studies of surveillance, 
Foucault does surprisingly not occupy a dominant but a 
minority position. Many scholars hold the position that 
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the notion of panoptic surveillance is outdated because 
it presupposes a surveillant centre that monitors the 
many. The rise of new technologies, especially the In-
ternet, would have decentralised surveillance and giv-
en rise to a democratisation of surveillance in which 
the many monitor those in power (“participatory sur-
veillance”). Although subordinate groups can and do 
make use of digital technologies for surveilling the sur-
veillors to a certain degree, the state and capitalists 
have much more resources than civil society and citi-
zens, which enables them to conduct much more in-
tensive and extensive forms of surveillance. They make 
use of decentralised surveillance for centralising sur-
veillant, economic, and political power. The NSA moni-
tors your use of Google and Facebook, but you do not 
monitor the NSA agent monitoring you, which shows a 
fundamental power asymmetry. Capital and the state 
are as collective actors the dominant surveillors. No-
tions such as the surveillant assemblage and participa-
tory surveillance are relativist and downplay the actual 
repressive power of capitalism and the state.  
“Surveillance studies” claims to be a new interdisci-
plinary field of research, teaching, and studies. It 
shares this claim with other new self-proclaimed inter-
/multi-/trans-/anti-disciplines such as science and 
technology studies (STS), Internet research, social me-
dia studies/research, social informatics, information 
science, web studies, systems theory/cybernetics, digi-
tal humanities, etc. Such claims serve the mere pur-
pose of accumulating academic resources in the com-
petition for research money, students, academic 
positions, departments and institutions, journals, pub-
lications, citations, etc. with other fields. Although dis-
guised as being inter- and transdisciplinary, the “new” 
trans- and interdisciplines are the new disciplines that 
share the same kind of power play with older fields and 
disciplines and thereby do not question, but reproduce 
the academic field’s logics of power and accumulation. 
They are not new, but old in their conservative repro-
duction and uncritical acceptance of academia’s power 
structures. I have found such claims and struggles for 
new fields completely pointless because the only thing 
that matters really is being a critical researcher, 
whereas one should not give a damn about identifying 
oneself as social researcher, media and communication 
researcher, surveillance researcher, computer scientist, 
or something different.  
Disciplinary box thinking is an evil that needs to be 
overcome. Critical theory is the only effective means 
that can be used for this purpose. Max Horkheimer 
(1931) understood critical theory as a truly interdisci-
plinary and holistic project that brings together various 
researchers from different backgrounds that study so-
ciety as a whole so that power structures, class, au-
thority, and domination are investigated in a manner 
that creates a better understanding that can contribute 
to the establishment of a non-instrumental society that 
fosters the public good, happiness and wealth for all. 
Critical research has under neoliberal conditions been 
rendered minoritarian. The struggle for new 
in/disciplines is part of the attempted neoliberalisation 
of (almost) everything. 
In “surveillance studies”, key proponents of the in-
stitutionalisation as a discipline have followed the 
strategy to inflate the object of study in order to make 
the claim that it is large enough for giving grounds to 
the formation of a new discipline that sees itself as be-
ing interdisciplinary. This has resulted in an uncritical, 
positivistic, and overgeneral understanding of surveil-
lance (Fuchs, 2011a). In contrast to Foucault, many 
surveillance scholars define surveillance as the collec-
tion of information for attaining a specific purpose and 
say that surveillance is not automatic positive or nega-
tive. A Nazi henchman monitoring Jews in Auschwitz 
who are sent to the gas chamber on the next day is in 
this administrative understanding equated on the same 
definitional level with a babyphone that monitors a 
sleeping baby, an electrocardiogram, or an earthquake 
detection system considered as constituting forms of 
surveillance. Such a concept of surveillance is not only 
completely useless for a critical theory, but also politi-
cally dangerous. For countering this tendency, we need 
a purely negative concept of surveillance, in which sur-
veillance is a specific form of control that forms one 
dimension of domination, exploitation, class, capital-
ism, patriarchy, racism, and similar negative phenome-
na (Fuchs, 2011a). Just like Adorno (1973/2003) was 
calling for a negative dialectic, we need based on Fou-
cault and Marx negative surveillance studies. A prob-
lem of the general understanding of surveillance is also 
that it makes surveillance categorically synonymous 
with information collection and processing so that no 
differentiation can be drawn between surveillance 
theory and information theory. 
Edward Snowden revealed in 2013 the existence of 
global Internet surveillance systems such as Prism, 
XKeyScore, or Tempora that are operated in collabora-
tions of secret services and capitalist communications 
companies. Hundreds of research projects focusing on 
privacy and surveillance could not uncover the exist-
ence of this surveillance-industrial Internet complex for 
the simple fact that surveillance power tends to be in-
visible and secret and it is difficult to challenge and in-
vestigate intransparent power. Institutions such as the 
European Union fund the development of new surveil-
lance technologies with hundreds of millions Euros, 
whereas the funding of critical, societal, and ethical 
impact assessment of information technologies is 
something quite new and is trapped in the contradic-
tion that such researchers find themselves put into 
large consortia with representatives of the surveil-
lance-industrial complex, who bring a conservative law 
and order position to projects that limits and biases re-
search. Snowden’s revelations also made once and for 
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all clear how conceptually wrong those who talk about 
a democratisation of surveillance and the emergence 
of “participatory surveillance” actually are. In the sur-
veillance-industrial complex, the world’s most powerful 
state institutions have collaborated with the world’s 
most powerful communications companies to imple-
ment totalitarian surveillance systems. It is a system 
that centralises control by monitoring decentralised 
technologies with multiple technologies and network-
ing the obtained data. The result is centralised surveil-
lance that as whole is a sum that is larger than its parts.  
Because there are citizens in the world who care 
about a better world, we fortunately have attempts to 
hold the powerful accountable with the help of Wik-
iLeaks, whistleblowing, investigative journalism, corpo-
rate watch platforms, alternative media, etc. The prob-
lem that critical citizens and critical media projects 
however face is that they often lack resources, visibil-
ity, attention, and power. They are in a minoritarian 
position and face power asymmetries that are consti-
tuted by the networked power of military, state and 
capitalist institutions. Surveillance is contested, but in 
the associated social struggles civil society and social 
movements are automatically disadvantaged in terms 
of resources and political economy. 
The rise of so-called social media has resulted in a 
new round of techno-optimism. Ideologues, politicians, 
management gurus, uncritical scholars, capitalists and 
their interest organisations, as well as a specific share 
of citizens, consumers, and users who uncritically ac-
cept the discourse that the new is always something 
better have argued that social media brings about po-
litical revolutions, creates employment, wealth for all, 
a new public sphere, participatory organisations, better 
democracies, etc. But in contrast to such claims, for ex-
ample recent rebellions and revolutions have not been 
Twitter and Facebook revolutions. Rather there is a 
complex dialectic of offline and online action, mediated 
and face-to-face communication in such forms of col-
lective political action (Fuchs, 2014c). In addition the 
positive vision has been proven wrong by the privacy 
implications of social media capital accumulation mod-
els that use in-built real time surveillance and the ex-
ploitation of digital labour (Fisher & Fuchs, 2015, Fuchs, 
2014a, 2014b, 2015; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2014; Sandoval, 
Fuchs, Prodnik, Sevignani, & Allmer, 2014), Snowden’s 
revelations (Fuchs & Trottier, forthcoming b), and 
Western capitalist communications companies’ exports 
of surveillance technologies to regimes that use these 
tools for monitoring activists who as a consequence 
have been threatened, tortured, and repressed (Fuchs, 
2013b; Fuchs, 2012b). 
In order to adequately understand the Internet, 
media, communications, and surveillance, we need a 
critical theory of society for the 21st century. Critical 
theory is a crucial tool that based on its long history 
and new developments in society, communications, 
and theory can create systematic knowledge that can 
support struggles for a humane society—a society 
without domination and without surveillance. 
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